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Abstract
Background: Our aim was to explore NHS staff perceptions and experiences of the impact on patient safety of
introducing a maternity system.
Methods: Qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted with 19 members of NHS staff who represented a
variety of staff groups (doctors, midwives, health care assistants), staff grades (consultant and midwife grades) and
wards within a maternity unit. Participants represented a single maternity unit at a NHS teaching hospital in the
North of England. Interviews were conducted during the first 12 months of the system being implemented and
were analysed thematically.
Results: Participants perceived there to be an elevated risk to patient safety during the system’s implementation.
The perceived risks were attributed to a range of social and technical factors. For example, poor system design and
human error which resulted in an increased potential for missing information and inputting error.
Conclusions: The first 12 months of introducing the maternity system was perceived to and in some cases had
already caused actual risk to patient safety. Trusts throughout the NHS are facing increasing pressure to become
paperless and should be aware of the potential adverse impacts on patient safety that can occur when
introducing electronic systems. Given the potential for increased risk identified, recommendations for further
research and for NHS trusts introducing electronic systems are proposed.
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Background
Electronic records are being introduced into many health-
care organisations around the world [1] and contain
patient information; personal, diagnosis, condition and
treatment details [2]. In the UK, electronic records are
seen as one mechanism by which the NHS can become
safer and more efficient. For example, NHS IT policy
claims that electronic records have the potential to
‘improve health and transform the quality and cost of
healthcare’ [3]. The goal of ‘electronic records for all’
was proposed in 1998 by the NHS IT strategy ‘Infor-
mation for Health’ [2] but remains an ambition of the
NHS, with recent IT strategies (2013, 2014) calling for
a paperless NHS by 2020 [3, 4]. However, despite an
estimated £10 billion being invested since 2002 [4, 5],
progress has been slow.
Policy and financial support for NHS trusts to imple-
ment electronic records implies a strong evidence base
supporting the idea that these systems can improve
health outcomes and quality of care. In reality, the litera-
ture is limited, as demonstrated in a recent systematic
review [6] of eHealth technologies and their impact on
the quality and safety of healthcare, which concluded
that there is a gap between the proposed and empirically
evidenced benefits of eHealth technologies. In addition,
there is little consideration given in existing literature to
potential negative effects of these systems on patient
safety, with existing evidence under-cited and predomin-
ately from the U.S whose health service has different
economic, organisational and structural foundations
from the UK [7–11]. In their review [6], Black et al pro-
vided some discussion into this and suggested that the
lack of evidence may be due to publication bias, with po-
tential conflicts of interest making it particularly difficult
to publish negative findings [6].
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Given policy pressures on hospitals to implement elec-
tronic records it is crucial that potential risks and safety
implications are examined, not just potential benefits.
NHS IT policy is often criticised for not evidencing its
aims, however to do so, evaluations of not only the
positive, but negative impacts of implementing electronic
records are essential [12]. In the NHS there is not a good
culture of error reporting as it often leads to blame alloca-
tion rather than process improvement. Risks are under-
reported [13] and so exploring perceptions and experi-
ences was considered a good way of understanding
current risks to patient safety, as opposed to incident re-
ports or observations. This study explored perceptions
and experiences of staff regarding the impact upon patient
safety of implementing a maternity system. Implementing
an electronic system into a maternity unit differs from
other specialties, as since the introduction of the ‘co-oper-
ation card’ in 1956, which made paper hand-held records
integral to maternity shared care [14], women in the UK
have been responsible for their own records throughout
pregnancy.
Methods
The study explored the implementation of a maternity
system in a Women’s and Newborn unit in a teaching
hospital in the North of England. The trust offers care to
approximately 6,000 women and families annually. To
protect the anonymity and confidentiality of the partici-
pating trust and the maternity system’s supplier it has not
been named and is referred to as ‘the system’ hereafter.
The system which can be integrated into a broader hospital
wide Electronic Patient Record has been implemented as a
departmental system to allow obstetric journeys to be elec-
tronically recorded. When fully implemented, it will be
used for a range of care activities: antenatal, delivery, post-
natal and community. Data collection took place between
April and November (2014) during the first year of the sys-
tem's implementation. Ethical approval was obtained by
the University of York Health Sciences Research Govern-
ance Committee in January 2014. NHS R&D approval from
the study site was also obtained in April 2014.
Theoretical approach
We drew upon socio-technical thinking [15], which aims
to determine how social influences affect the performance
of technical systems [16]. This approach challenges the
idea that IT projects fail due to technological reasons
alone [17] by giving equal weight to social and technical
issues affecting the implementation and adoption of tech-
nology in healthcare [16]. Socio-technical thinking has
been applied to studies evaluating the implementation of
electronic records [18] based on the premise that these
systems do not merely store information, but influence
care. The approach assumes ‘people and technologies are
linked within complex, dynamic, socio-technical networks
that enable and inhibit what is possible within certain
situations and contexts’ [18]. This study used socio-
technical thinking when analysing interview data to
establish themes illustrating clinician’s perceptions and
experiences of how the system has impacted patient
safety [19].
Recruitment and sampling strategy
As the system was implemented in stages and interviews
were conducted during the first year of the system's im-
plementation, the amount of time that staff had been
using the system when interviewed varied. It was antici-
pated that staff and wards across the maternity unit would
be using the system differently because of their varying
roles and responsibilities. To try and reflect this variation,
a purposive sampling frame was used to recruit from a
range of staff groups and grades to understand their per-
ceptions and experiences of the system’s impact on patient
safety across a range of usage. Staff from the unit who
were directly involved in the implementation of the sys-
tem were recruited as key informants, their perceptions
and experiences of the system potentially differing from
those not actively involved in supporting the system’s
implementation.
Participants were recruited via telephone, email and a
junior doctors’ WhatsApp group. The purposive sampling
frame was used until a sample that qualitatively repre-
sented a range of specialities and professions throughout
the maternity unit was achieved.
Participants
Of the 29 members of staff invited to take part in the
study, 19 individuals consented and were interviewed.
The sample comprised 11 midwives (grade 5 to 7), 7
doctors (Senior House Officers to Consultant) and 1
health care assistant. Participants were recruited from a
range of different wards throughout the maternity unit
including; maternity assessment centre, community, birth
centre, labour and the antenatal day unit and had between
5 and 28 years professional experience. 4 participants were
members of the system support team whose role was to
champion the system and assist staff users.
Interview design and content
Interviews were conducted face-to-face, were semi-
structured and followed a topic guide (Additional file 1)
which was informed by the literature and prior discussion
with key informants. Findings presented here are part
of a wider study and so following informed consent,
interviewees were asked about their perceptions and
experiences of the benefits and barriers to the implemen-
tation of the system as well as the impact of the system
upon their practice and patient safety.
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Analysis
Interviews were transcribed verbatim and analysed themat-
ically in five stages: transcription, familiarisation, coding,
theme development and data reporting [20]. The research
team were consulted throughout code and theme devel-
opment. Following each interview, reflexive notes [21]
were taken with personal and methodological changes
or challenges noted and considered during analysis.
Results
During interviews, NHS staff described how they perceived,
and in some instances experienced, an increased risk to
patient safety. Significantly more challenges were reported
(and with more emotion) than benefits of the system. A
concerted effort to maintain balance was made during
interviews; however it became clear that challenges to
patient safety outweighed perceived benefits and so these
concerns were allowed to emerge unconstrained by the
interviewer. From the analysis the two key themes
emerging for perceived increased risk related to social
(e.g. computer literacy) and technical factors (e.g. system
design).
Social factors affecting the safe use of the system
The introduction of the system was perceived to be as-
sociated with an increased potential for inputting error,
as staff were not used to using the system and so felt
they were more prone to making mistakes. Reflecting
this belief, inputting errors were considered most likely
to occur when junior doctors or new staff joined the
wards and/or following upgrades to the system, which
required an element of re-learning. Interviewees with
low levels of computer literacy were concerned that their
lack of typing skills could make them more prone to
inputting errors. For some, lack of confidence and ner-
vousness at the prospect of typing in front of colleagues
and patients caused them to feel scared to use the sys-
tem. One participant described how this had resulted in
some staff shying away from using the system altogether,
placing their computing workload onto others. Concerns
over inputting errors were exacerbated by the potential
implications that entering incorrect information onto the
system may have for patient safety. For example, inputting
errors can make it appear that a patient has received care
or has a condition they do not have, both of which could
impact upon the length of stay and treatment provided.
Additionally, if inputting errors are not noticed by staff
and incorrect information remains on the system, there is
the potential for legal as well as medical consequences:
Midwife 062712: it’s my legal documents and I’m not
the quickest typist in the world, I’m not a trained
typist, so the amount of time it took me to make sure
that you’ve got everything spelt right and…written
down because our documents follow us for 25 years
(41-44).
Some participants were concerned that less detail is
being entered onto the system than paper records allowed.
This was largely attributed to typing feeling more dis-
jointed and taking longer than writing. To save time some
staff only answered mandatory questions on the system,
which would not cover everything necessary for all pa-
tients and all staff, increasing the risk that information
may go unrecorded. The accuracy of patient records was
also questioned. Although, there is a risk that incorrect in-
formation could also have been written into paper records,
interviewees felt that the system brought new risks, from
staff using the system differently and the system allowing
the same information to be inputted into different places;
increasing the risk of missing information. Participants de-
scribed how mistakes were most likely when first using
the system and that they have to trust that their colleagues
are inputting information correctly and in the right place.
Further concerns that staff are not highlighting risk
factors, allergies and test results adequately were raised:
Consultant 180703: in the olden days if somebody had
a full blood count on their notes was a little box to say
they had it done so if I saw patient and did a full
blood count there would be a little box and hopefully
that would prompt the next person when they see the
patient to say ‘she has a box from last time so let me
check that full blood count’ whereas I am not sure we
are highlighting that adequately in the way we are
using it (158–162).
Technical factors affecting the safe use of the system
Compared with paper notes, staff reported finding it
harder to find the information they need. This was at-
tributed to the design of the system making it difficult to
use and navigate around. Consequently, participants per-
ceived there to be an increased risk that patient informa-
tion may be missed, with this risk elevated when the
system was first implemented and staff were becoming
accustomed to using it and how information was pre-
sented. The way the system presents information was a
particular issue for women classed as frequent attenders,
who have a large number of record entries. For these
women, because the system presents information chrono-
logically, important information can become buried under
large amounts of routine information. Although this could
be argued to be an issue with paper records, clinicians
were used to paper notes and so were able to quickly find
the information they needed. To avoid missing informa-
tion when using the system some clinicians defaulted to
asking women to tell them of important clinical informa-
tion. This was not always possible, for instance, in
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emergency situations and where English is not the pa-
tients’ first language. Failing to identify important infor-
mation in patient notes could have significant implications
for safety:
Midwife 133002: I think we will miss something
because we don’t know where to look for the information
or we’ll miss a problem and an alert and it will lead to
a baby becoming septic or a mother becoming unwell
(107–108).
The lack of flexible data entry methods such as being
able to draw diagrams was also criticised as staff are not
able to elaborate their typed data entry particularly when
documenting operative procedures. Consequently, patient
information is being presented in a standardised fashion
which although desirable, was felt in this instance to result
in missing the nuances and details of individual patients
and procedures. The implications for not having sufficient
information, particularly relating to patient histories, aller-
gies and risk factors were discussed:
Consultant 042202: people were picking up from the
down select button they were going to the minimum,
easiest quickest route so every operations looked
exactly the same…all caesarean sections looked exactly
the same…and as a clinician for 15–20 years I know
that not every caesarean section is the same (169–171)
Staff also explained how they have to ‘fight over’ insuf-
ficient numbers of computers. Time spent waiting for a
computer to become available and then logging onto the
system was perceived to be increasing the length of dis-
charge and clinic waiting times. Furthermore, computers
that are available are placed at the opposite ends of the
ward to women, forcing staff to leave women to access
the system; a problem exacerbated by the lack of hand-
held devices. Participants described how this is a particu-
lar issue in emergency situations where they are faced
with the conundrum of either leaving women and risking
them deteriorating as they try to locate and access an
available computer, or staying to treat women without
having ready access to their records. The implications of
not having access to patient records were discussed, par-
ticularly in situations where women cannot speak English
and so cannot communicate key information relating to
their previous history:
Midwife 091203: my main concern would be that we
would miss women that come in and whether they are
MRSA positive and it’s stuck to the front of the notes
and it won’t be any more… simple things like that to a
HIV positive and we are not going to know that until
we get to a computer and we might not have time to
get to a computer which…could really affect the
delivery… of the baby so that would be the biggest
issue is not knowing if they come in and they do it
quickly not being able to access the computer its
potentially putting them at risk and we can be putting
us at risk (87–95).
Technical issues also caused problems with access to
information. Staff are required to log in and out of the
system individually for each woman and are not allo-
cated their own clinic rooms. Clinicians are subsequently
finding it difficult to change rooms and log into the sys-
tem within the 5 minutes allocated for clinic appoint-
ments, causing delays. Participants explained how
particularly during busy clinics when staff are repeatedly
logging in and out of the system, on the same computer,
the system is “freezing” and sometimes “crashing”. This
has caused access to patient records to be suspended
and in some cases women to be sent home from clinics.
The implications of this were seen to be exacerbated by
staff in these situations resorting to ad-hoc paper docu-
mentation, increasing the risk of information being lost
or not being inputted once the system is back up and
running. Staff were particularly concerned and unclear
as to who is liable in the event of a patient safety inci-
dent occurring as a result of the system crashing and ac-
cess to records being suspended. Community midwives
shared this anxiety surrounding liability following ‘near
misses’ in the community where the system could not be
accessed due to poor internet access.
Midwife 051602: I’ve recently had a case where I
couldn’t get a signal….and …this was a very high risk
pregnancy, I did know the patient very well…the high
risk issue poses a risk to us as well as to her and if I’d
have gone out and say she had delivered at home
unprepared….and no access to any records I think is a
massive risk to this organisation and to the midwives
and the woman, there was no signal…it was in the city
center…I’m quite scared by it to be honest (55–60).
Participants also described how the quality of care has
been affected by clinicians not having access to patient in-
formation before consultations. Direct comparisons were
made with the paper records, which allowed clinician’s to
‘flick through’ patient’s notes beforehand. However, with
all patient information being on the system, clinical staff
felt they were having to enter consultations ‘blind’ without
any understanding of the patients history or reason for at-
tending clinics necessitating obtaining this information
through small talk; which was reported as challenging
given the time constraints of appointments. One partici-
pant described how not having access to patient notes
prior to appointments has led to some ‘real faux-pas’:
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Doctor 111609: It would be nice to look at somebody’s
notes on a laptop or something outside the room and
see what you are talking about rather than go into a
room cold with a patient and then say ‘who are you?
Why are you here? How many times have you been
pregnant?’ and they say ‘three times’ and you say ‘oh
how are your three children?’ and they go ‘well actually
one of them died’ (154–160).
The system’s data entry methods which mainly involve
the use of tick boxes and drop down menus were thought
to elevate the risk of inputting errors. Particularly under
time constraints it was considered too easy for clinicians
to tick the wrong box. Midwives described how this had
led to incorrect results or conditions for women being
entered which if undetected can impact upon women’s
treatment and length of stay. Additional implications from
inputting errors are discussed below:
Midwife 081203: the implications could be the wrong
information is down, the wrong date of birth, or the
wrong NHS number, It can cause problems further
down the line and I guess the problem is that from a
midwife point of view people might not actually be
aware of what those implications might be if the baby
doesn’t have an NHS number or it hasn’t been
registered properly they turn up to the registrar’s office
to get a birth certificate and they’ve put the wrong
gender down. I mean that’s quite a common mistake
that people make and it’s not because they don’t know
if it’s a boy or a girl it’s just they’re tired or the cursor
just flips from female to male or there’s contradictory
information (151–159).
Lastly, participants felt that the potential impact of er-
rors made on the system is elevated by staff ’s inability to
rectify their mistakes as they only have the ability to in-
put but not edit records. Staff must rely upon a support
team or colleagues who have been made “super users” to
correct errors. Additionally, the number of clinicians
who have received the extended training and have been
made “super users” is limited and the support team are
only available during office hours Monday-Friday. There-
fore, should an error be made on a Friday at 6.00pm this
incorrect information would remain on a woman’s record
potentially until after the weekend, unless a super-user
was available. One example of the implications of this is
outlined below:
Midwife 091203: it wouldn’t let us save this new baby
because it didn’t believe that she’d had another
pregnancy and it wouldn’t not let us do it at all and
we’d tried all sorts but this was the documentation for
the parents to take home that I just couldn’t give them
because the system wouldn’t let me finish it and that
was on the Saturday and nobody was in till the
Tuesday (183–186).
Discussion
Interviews revealed that NHS staff perceived there to be
an increased risk to patient safety during the first 12
months of the system’s implementation. Some staff were
able to give specific examples of where they thought use
of the system had put patient safety at risk. The social
and technical factors identified here, were largely a result
of human factors and system design which were felt to
have increased the risk of inputting errors and of miss-
ing patient information.
Our study has identified perceived constraints and
limitations of new electronic records. It is surprising that
there has been so little research into the potential harms
of implementing electronic systems into the NHS on pa-
tient safety. Previous research has focused on potential
benefits of these systems, such as reducing inputting er-
rors and adverse drug events [22–26]. This study’s find-
ings correspond with a limited and predominately U.S
evidence base, which has identified human errors and
technical issues associated with Health Information
Technology [8–12, 27–33] and which have the potential
to increase the risks for patient safety. Sittig and Singh’s
[10] framework for the development of electronic rec-
ord specific patient safety goals can be used to help
conceptualise the findings within this study and those
within the existing literature. The framework, suggests
a 3-phase approach for measuring and monitoring safety
concerns, categorising concerns as those which are spe-
cific to technology (e.g., issues with the system crashing or
an insufficient number of computers available), or which
result from the incorrect use of technology (e.g., inputting
error due to poor computer literacy). In its final phase, the
framework considers the use of technology to monitor
risks, healthcare processes and outcomes for identifying
concerns before a patient is harmed. The framework may
therefore provide a useful mechanism for raising aware-
ness of the potential risks associated with electronic re-
cords. The third phase of the framework may also prove
useful for highlighting the limited evidence surrounding
the use of technology to monitor patient safety risks.
The study adds to an emerging but limited evidence
base that has reported potential negative impacts of elec-
tronic systems upon patient safety. The purposive sam-
pling frame enabled a more comprehensive representation
of the way that the system is perceived and experienced to
of impacted patient safety to emerge. Additionally, the use
of socio-technical thinking during the interpretation of
the study’s findings allowed a more in-depth interpretation
of the data that went beyond a descriptive list of themes
to be obtained. The study’s main limitation was that it was
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undertaken with NHS staff within a single maternity unit
at a NHS trust. A number of the issues identified within
this study were the result of the particular systems’ design
and implementation. For instance, the system did not have
the capacity for diagrams and there were insufficient com-
puters stationed in inappropriate places. These issues, that
had potential ramifications for patient safety, may not
necessarily be experienced by other trusts implementing
different electronic systems. However, it is likely that
many of these factors would be transferable to other simi-
lar large hospital trusts and other clinical specialties.
It has been suggested that to effectively evaluate
technology and its impact on safety, evaluation needs
to occur continuously prior to, during and following
implementation [34]. In this study, interviews took place
at just one point in time-during the first year of the sys-
tem’s implementation’. It is therefore possible that partici-
pants’ views may have changed or be representative of
only that stage of implementation. Although it would have
been preferable to conduct interviews throughout the
‘evaluation lifecycle’ [34] this was not possible due to sig-
nificant delays to the system’s implementation restricting
the time available for interviews to be conducted.
Policymakers around the world are placing hospitals
under increasing pressure to implement electronic sys-
tems, through funding [4] and policies emphasising the
potential of these systems to ‘transform healthcare’ and
improve patient safety [3]. The absence of any consider-
ation of potential negative impacts of introducing elec-
tronic records in policy, particularly in the early stages of
implementation, could result in unrealistic expectations
and patient safety being jeopardised. On the basis of the
study’s findings, a number of recommendations would
seem worthy of consideration (Table 1).
Conclusions
This study identified that during the first year of imple-
mentation there may be a period of increased risk to pa-
tient safety, as staff become accustomed to using the
system. Given the global focus on digitising health, it is
important that organisations are aware of and do not
underestimate the potential risks. This study has identified
perceptions and so further research is needed to deter-
mine the actual level and scale of the risk during early
implementation of electronic systems. This could be
achieved by quantifying errors and harm using robust
case note review or through linking qualitative findings
around increased risk with standardised hospital reporting
procedures such as incident reports which would help to
ascertain and validate perceptions and experiences of risk.
Additionally, research that seeks to determine the impact
upon patient safety during initial implementation should
aim to study a number of different electronic systems
across different trusts to identify common risk factors.
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Table 1 Recommendations for implementing technology into healthcare organisations
Recommendations
Engagement of front line staff and feedback Hospitals should not underestimate and should acknowledge the potential risks by
providing regular opportunities for front line staff to voice their concerns. Trusts
should also work closely with clinicians to increase their vigilance and preparedness
for potential errors in the early phases of implementation.
Technology and hardware Prior to introducing systems, hospitals should ensure that sufficient hardware is placed
in appropriate locations to prevent delays to clinics and risks in emergency situations.
Where technologically and financially possible, mobile devices or computers on wheels
may help to alleviate situations where staff are choosing between accessing information
and staying with acutely unwell patients.
During system down times or failures, back up or well communicated procedures and
policies should be incorporated and understood by all staff. For instance, if paper is to
be reverted to then it should be a mandatory requirement that any information recorded
on paper during these periods should then be inserted onto the system once it is ‘up and
running’ to prevent important information from being lost or missed in future.
Training and support Training should be provided on an on-going basis so that those finding using the system
difficult can gain extra support with basic IT training sessions advisable. IT support teams
should be available 24/7 to reflect the 24/7 provision of clinical care in hospitals. To ensure
that those with poor computer literacy are supported, basic IT training, including typing
skills should be made available, particularly during initial implementation. Hospitals should
also be responsible for ensuring that all staff are computer literate.
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